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HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE* 
The promotion of human rights fits comfortably into the rhetorical 
projection of United States foreign policy from the point of view of 
conservative as well as liberal politicians, and it has been an enduring element 
of our cultural consciousness.  As expressed in the seventeenth century by John 
Winthrop, we have regarded ourselves as a “City upon a Hill,”1 an example to 
be emulated by the rest of the world.  Our lessons have included popular 
sovereignty, democratic liberalism and free market capitalism.  In the twentieth 
century, as a nation we promoted the rule of law and human rights, taking the 
lead in establishing the institutional structures that provide the framework for 
contemporary international relations—the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade 
Organization—and introducing human rights considerations into some of their 
deliberations.  We took a leading role in the creation of two separate spheres of 
a new international human rights law: (1) the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR),2 which laid the foundation for the development of 
substantive civil law principles, and (2) a new phase of international criminal 
law with the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals. 
Harold Koh and his colleagues in the Clinton Administration continued 
and enhanced this American tradition.  Now, in his article, A United States 
Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century,3 Professor Koh has provided an 
ambitious blueprint for future administrations to follow in continuing our 
country’s support for international human rights into the twenty-first century.  
From the perspective of a human rights advocate, the Koh principles are 
unimpeachable.  But there are other perspectives that also reflect American 
values and influence U.S. foreign policy, such as international military 
security, multinational business, investment and trade, and economic 
 
* Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles. 
 1. John Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Charity, in AMERICAN SERMONS: THE PILGRIMS 
TO MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 42 (Library Classics of the United States, Inc. ed., 1999) (1630), 
available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/intrel/winthrop.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2002). 
 2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 A 
(III) (1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2002). 
 3. Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 293 (2002). 
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development assistance.  In light of these potentially conflicting considerations 
it is unrealistic to expect that pure human rights principles can always be 
implemented.  Indeed, to the contrary, in some situations the pursuit of human 
rights objectives may well be undesirable. 
I.  THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Professor Koh is correct to emphasize the importance of collecting and 
reporting information to the entire human rights enterprise.  Especially in the 
early years, the human rights movement’s most verifiable achievements 
consisted of “shaming” abusive governments in the hope that negative 
publicity would translate into an enforcement mechanism for change.  The 
problem of enforcement is still a significant4 problem facing the protagonists 
of human rights, and shaming is still a principal enforcement technique.  In that 
regard, the State Department’s annual country reports on human rights 
practices and religious freedom provide, as Professor Koh suggests, an 
important “official . . . information base” for United States policy-making, and 
a resource for international institutions, media and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) around the world.5  They provide a powerful supplement 
to the international chorus constructed by human rights institutions and NGOs 
for the purpose of “shaming” abusive governments.  And their credibility 
depends on the perception of the concerned community that the government is 
“telling the truth.” 
On the surface that imperative is not controversial.  Yet, it is important not 
to underestimate the complexity of achieving this objective.  First, those who 
collect the information and compile the reports are diplomats and officials of 
the State Department; they are not judges.  They are by profession trained to 
understand the cultures they encounter on their own terms.  They value good 
relations with their foreign counterparts and are adept at the art of compromise.  
Their understanding of “the truth” inevitably is conditioned by their 
professional role, and will not infrequently be quite different from that of a 
human rights advocate.  If publishing the truth about Saudi police practices and 
treatment of women has an impact on something important, like investment 
decisions or travel restrictions on its elite, then we can also be certain that 
Saudi Arabia will exert counter-pressure to revise the report.  It should not be 
surprising to see a resulting report reflecting a measure of obfuscation and 
ambiguity, for which diplomats are properly trained. 
Second, telling “the truth” may not always be the most prudent course of 
action in the national interest.  In this regard, it is important to keep in mind the 
fundamental anomaly, if not inconsistency, in thinking of foreign policy and 
 
 4. A more significant problem is acceptance of human rights norms.  See infra text 
accompanying note 11. 
 5. Koh, supra note 3, at 306. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY 467 
diplomatic pressure as enforcement mechanisms for human rights.  Most 
fundamentally, foreign policy is inherently an unprincipled enterprise, 
reflecting compromises of values and objectives on an ad hoc basis.  Human 
rights, on the other hand, embody principle, universally and consistently 
applied.  Foreign policy is about politics; human rights is about law.  It is 
neither realistic nor desirable for the values of human rights advocacy to be 
perpetually paramount to all other values sought to be protected by American 
foreign policy.  The range of those other values covers a full spectrum, from 
the crass, like protecting a corporation’s investment position, to important 
national objectives such as protecting an unfettered supply of oil, an open trade 
environment, nuclear non-proliferation, and—especially after September 11—
defense, intelligence and police cooperation in combating terrorism.  It would, 
for example, seem prudent to moderate criticism of Russia’s practices in 
Chechnya in exchange for cooperation in Central Asia helpful to supporting 
the war in Afghanistan.6  Accordingly, a blueprint for American human rights 
policy in the twenty-first century must acknowledge that human rights are but 
one of many values promoted by American foreign policy, and will not always 
receive prominent treatment. 
A second fundamental problem in achieving the ambitious agenda outlined 
by Professor Koh is the awkward fact that, empirically, human rights are not 
universal, notwithstanding the assertions of their proponents and their overly 
optimistic inferences from the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights.7  
This problem has been with us from the beginning.  The UDHR was adopted at 
a time before most contemporary states existed, and before the full dimensions 
of cultural differences were in the educated public consciousness.8  The 
Declaration was also a product of political compromise, masking fundamental 
disagreements under general language and conflicting “rights.”9  And of 
course, as a General Assembly resolution, it did not purport to be legally 
binding so a vote in its favor carried no political cost.10 
Since then, of course, enormous progress has been made in drafting, and 
bringing into force legally binding treaties covering all aspects of human 
rights.  These accomplishments should not be underestimated.  Nevertheless, 
they reflect the limitations inherent in the “top-down” approach to achievement 
of human rights goals and there are two significant defects in the treaty-making 
process.  First, many states have adopted broad reservations, precluding 
 
 6. Of course, if a Human Rights Report does not make any significant difference to anyone, 
then telling the truth does no harm.  I am inclined to believe, however, that the reporting exposure 
over time does have an impact. 
 7. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR World Conference on 
Human Rights, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993). 
 8. G.A. Res. 217A (III), supra note 2. 
 9. See generally id. 
 10. See generally id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
468 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:465 
coverage of politically or culturally sensitive topics, like gender equality.  
Second, many states that have ratified the important treaties have little 
dedication to the rule of law in the first place.  These states collectively include 
those which are the worst violators of human rights, such as Iraq, China and 
the Sudan.  The uncomfortable fact is that many governments become parties 
to conventions that they simply do not intend to implement beyond the most 
formal measures. 
That phenomenon calls attention to the critical importance of the “inside-
outside” approach outlined by Professor Koh.11  If rights are to be realized, it is 
often more than simply a matter of formal law, such as by assuring that the 
norms have been adopted and are enforced in the same manner as ordinary 
domestic laws.  For any domestic incorporation of international norms to be 
effective, the host society must embrace a culture of respect for rights and the 
rule of law.  This in turn, in some cases, entails fundamental cultural change. 
The process of cultural change is, of course, complex and varies from 
society to society.  Nevertheless, there are some elements that could be 
addressed as a matter of U.S. foreign policy.  These include nourishing through 
the development assistance program community organizations and other 
elements of civil society.  Such support may not easily fit the contours of 
traditional “economic development,” but a flourishing civil society 
undoubtedly creates a demand for human rights. 
United States foreign policy could also devote substantially more resources 
to exposing populations in human-rights deprived countries to Western culture 
in the form of film, radio, television and popular literature, which could 
indirectly promote the ideas of choice, new values, alternative social roles 
(especially for women) and the desirability of human rights.  People-to-people 
diplomacy could also be boosted.  The Peace Corps could be expanded.  Wide-
ranging exchange programs, involving business people, technicians, students at 
all levels, academics, artists, journalists and others, could expose people to the 
ideas and values of each other’s cultures.  At a governmental level we could 
expand training military, police and judicial figures. 
These projects do not necessarily focus specifically on human rights, but 
indirectly help create an environment in which their premises—such as the 
preeminence of individual choice—are introduced and demand for rights 
increased.  Funding programs of these types also enable the United States to 
avoid directly challenging another government while creating conditions for 
more successful “top down” intervention later.  In the long run, dissemination 
of ideas through civil society may be the most effective tool for social change, 
including human rights implementation.  The emphasis of human rights foreign 
policy should thus focus on this level and not worry so much about the politics 
 
 11. Koh, supra note 3, at 316-22. 
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of the U.N. Human Rights Commission or photo opportunities accompanying 
various declarations at high level meetings. 
II.  THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Clinton Administration revived attention to another, entirely different 
part of the human rights universe—international criminal law—by leading the 
U.N. Security Council to establish War Crimes Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and by signing the treaty creating an International 
Criminal Court (ICC).12 
International human rights law deals primarily with the responsibility of 
governments for the treatment of its citizens and the attendant civil liability of 
governments and government officials.13  In that sense it is like domestic 
constitutional and tort law.  International criminal law, on the other hand, deals 
with the criminal responsibility of government officials and ordinary soldiers 
for acts committed in war, civil war and other armed conflict.  The substance 
of the law governs the conduct of war, such as the treatment of prisoners and 
civilian populations and the regulation of weapons.  This body of law traces its 
origins to customary international law codified in conventions at the 1899 and 
1907 Hague Peace Conferences, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 
Geneva Protocols of 1977.14  The crimes defined internationally in these 
treaties have been generally applied by states through domestic military or 
other courts.  Until the ICC there was no generally available international 
tribunal with jurisdiction to try these internationally-defined crimes. 
After World War II, the victorious Allies established the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo International Military Tribunals, with authority to try German and 
Japanese officials for “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity.”15  
Subsequently, the U.N. International Law Commission (ILC) spent more than 
 
 12. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, December 31, 2000, 37 I.L.M. 999, 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/rome-en-c.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 13. It also imposes obligations on governments with respect to activity within the “private” 
sphere, but, except for the Torture and Genocide Conventions, does not define and require 
punishment of an international crime.  See also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1984), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2002); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
G.A. Res. 260 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/260 (III) A (1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu3/b/p_genoci.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2002). 
 14. For a brief description of these achievements, see Women’s Int’l League for Peace and 
Freedom, The Laws of War—Also Known as International Humanitarian Law, at 
http://www.peacewomen.org/un/icj/warlaw.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2002). 
 15. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 5.  They were also tried for “crimes against the peace,” 
which was undefined, but referred to waging a war of aggression.  The new ICC will have 
jurisdiction over such crimes “once a provision is adopted . . . defining the crime and setting out 
the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”  Id. 
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four decades attempting to draft an international criminal code with 
jurisdiction for an international court.  That work was fruitless until the end of 
the Cold War.  At that time, the U.N. Security Council was no longer disabled 
by the threat of U.S. or Soviet vetoes and responded to the atrocities in the 
Balkans and in Rwanda by establishing ad hoc war crimes tribunals to deal 
with those specific situations.  The crimes over which they had jurisdiction 
built on the definitions applicable in the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials and in the 
ILC draft code.  Finally, in 1994, the U.N. General Assembly created a 
Preparatory Committee to draft a statute for a permanent international criminal 
court, which produced the 1998 Rome Statute for the International Criminal 
Court.16 
After fifty years, and in no small part because of the Clinton 
Administration’s dedication to the objective, the world soon will have a 
permanent criminal court to deal with genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.  On the surface this seems like a major landmark in the development 
of international human rights, a pillar of criminal law comparable to the pillar 
of civil law consisting of the UDHR and the core international Covenants and 
Conventions.  President Clinton signed the ICC convention shortly before 
leaving office, thereby marking the U.S. contribution to its creation.17 
Nevertheless, the ICC is not likely to play a significant role for the 
foreseeable future in U.S. foreign policy.  Conservative Republicans have 
strongly opposed U.S. adherence on the grounds that U.S. military personnel 
would be subject to politically motivated prosecutions, even as they participate 
in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations.  President Bush has announced that he will 
not send the treaty to the Senate for its approval.18 
III.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
The implications of the September 11 attacks on the United States 
overwhelm the subject of this Childress Lecture, but some aspects of the Bush 
Administration’s reaction carry implications for international human rights 
diplomacy. 
In creating a legal framework in which to examine the September 11 
attacks, one can view them as a crisis of foreign policy, military security and 
war.  Or they can be viewed as a problem of law enforcement and criminal 
justice involving crimes both under domestic law and under international 
criminal law.  The two approaches are not mutually exclusive; but neither quite 
captures the reality of the situation.  The attacks were not “war” in the classic 
sense of a national army attacking another, or even in the sense of civil war 
 
 16. See generally id. 
 17. See Bill Richardson, Shunning the International Criminal Court Would Be Wrong, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 22, 2001, at http://www.iht.com/articles/29991.html. 
 18. Id. 
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that became so common in the late twentieth century.  Nor were the attacks 
common crimes in the sense of acts deviating from societal norms.  They were 
attacks on the norms themselves; an assault on the United States as a society 
and on its government, its foreign policy, its economic success and dominance, 
and its reflection of modern culture.  Accordingly, the attacks can be viewed 
from three different, but not mutually incompatible, perspectives: as a 
domestic crime, as an international crime or as an act of war.  The Bush 
Administration responded on all three fronts.  Most prominently, it treated the 
attacks as an act of war and responded within the legal authority provided 
domestically by an act of Congress and internationally by the inherit right of 
self-defense reflected in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.19  Its legal claims on 
both counts were soundly based and uncontroversial.  In treating the attacks as 
international crimes, on the other hand, the Administration’s responses was 
constitutionally unusual and controversial, and may raise problems for U.S. 
human rights diplomacy. 
The September 11 attacks, of course, were crimes under U.S. domestic 
law, and the perpetrators could be tried as ordinary criminals, as was the case 
of the perpetrators of the earlier World Trade Center bombing and the bombing 
of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam.  Such trials would not be 
easy: most of the participants and evidence are abroad, and perhaps not in 
jurisdictions willing to cooperate with extradition and information sharing; 
much of the evidence would probably be based on intelligence sources and 
methods that cannot be disclosed in open court or shared with the defendants; 
and finding an impartial jury would be challenging.  Moreover, one could 
readily imagine a reincarnation of the O.J. Simpson trial, in which protracted 
proceedings could degenerate into a trial of U.S. foreign policy or the merits of 
globalism.  In any event, even though American lawyers may not doubt that 
the United States could conduct a fair trial of Osama bin Laden, it is likely that 
many foreign observers would not be as generous. 
Consequently, some commentators have suggested an international trial of 
some sort, perhaps an ad hoc tribunal established by the Security Council or a 
tribunal established by special international agreement.20 The crimes 
committed on September 11 were not only U.S. domestic crimes; they were 
also international crimes, namely, crimes against humanity and war crimes.  
These are crimes of the sort that the rejected International Criminal Court 
(ICC) could deal with once it is established and of the sort dealt with by special 
War Crime Tribunals established by the U.N. Security Council for the former 
 
 19. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
 20. The International Criminal Court, which the Bush Administration rejected, see supra text 
accompanying note 18, would also deal with crimes against humanity and war crimes.  See Rome 
Statute, supra note 12, art. 5. 
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Yugoslavia (ICTY)21 and for Rwanda (ICTR).22  The Bush Administration, 
however, decided to proceed unilaterally.  Although the FBI and domestic law 
enforcement agencies treated the attacks as domestic crimes from the 
beginning and conducted investigations in that manner, the Bush 
Administration eventually elected to treat the attacks as also being violations of 
the laws of war.  However, instead of seeking an international tribunal, the 
Administration maintained its preference for unilateral action based on 
domestic law and unilateral interpretations of international norms. 
By Military Order, the President provided for trial by military tribunals of 
any non-citizen that the President determined was a member of Al Queda or 
was a person who engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit acts of 
terrorism, or was a person who knowingly harbored a terrorist.23  Such 
individuals could be tried for “violations of the laws of war and other 
applicable laws by military tribunals.”24  The procedures would be established 
by the Secretary of Defense.25  They would not necessarily carry safeguards 
provided by the Bill of Rights, and the only appeal would lie to the Secretary 
or the President.26  Moreover, the Order seems intended to effect a suspension 
of the writ of habeas corpus in that it provides that the defendant “shall not be 
privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding . . . [in] any 
court . . .” including federal, state, foreign and international tribunals.27 
In executing the Order, the President relied on his constitutional authority 
as President and as Commander in Chief,28 in addition to implied statutory 
authority under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.29  The Order declares 
that the attacks created “a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the 
United States Armed Forces.”30  The reference to the “laws of war” suggest 
that the military tribunals would try defendants for international war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, which the ICTY, ICTR and ICC have dealt with.  
Nevertheless, it may be questioned whether the September 11 attacks and U.S. 
response fully add up to “war” for purposes of invoking the Geneva 
Conventions and the body of law (which in any event is customary 
international law) comprising war crimes.  The concept of crimes against 
 
 21. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
 22. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
 23. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Issues Military Order (November 
13, 2001) [hereinafter Press Release], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2001/11/20011113-27.html. 
 24. Id. § 1(e). 
 25. Id. § 4(b). 
 26. Id. § 4(c)(8). 
 27. Id. § 7(b). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 29. See generally Press Release, supra note 23. 
 30. Id. § 1(a). 
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humanity seems broader, and the U.N. Human Rights Commissioner opined 
that the attacks amounted to such crimes.31  Absent an international tribunal, 
however, it will be up to the United States, acting through these special 
military courts, to elaborate the meaning of its jurisdictional charter.  The 
reference to “other applicable laws”32 may also suggest possible trials for 
violations of regular federal and state criminal laws.  Such a sweep would 
seem anomalous for a military tribunal and gives added fuel to the extensive 
critical reaction to the Order. 
Critics especially deplored the insensitivity to normal constitutional 
guarantees.  It is nevertheless not so clear that the Order is constitutionally 
deficient.  Since the eighteenth century Presidents have occasionally 
established military tribunals for the purpose of trying civilians for violations 
of the laws of war.  Given that practice, it is at least arguable that the Bill of 
Rights applies differently to those tribunals than to an ordinary criminal trial.  
In addition, the question of whether the writ of habeas corpus may be 
suspended without Congressional authorization seems open to debate.  There 
are two elements of the Order that nevertheless seem more questionable than 
others.  Military tribunals historically have tried belligerents (meaning, persons 
associated with the enemy), thus to the extent that the Order covers terrorists 
generally, beyond those connected with the September 11 attacks, it departs 
from precedent.  Moreover, to the extent that it purports to cut off access to 
foreign and international tribunals, it seems clearly beyond the President’s (and 
the United States’) authority.  A possible problem for the Administration’s 
approach may come from the reluctance of Spain and other European 
governments to extradite suspects because of their belief that the military 
tribunals will not meet international human rights standards.33  Such a reaction 
would starkly pose the political choice that governments must make between 
human rights values and those of military security. 
The September 11 attacks may also offer a concrete test, although 
hypothetical, of how the ICC might address these problems.  The ICC would 
probably not have been an effective alternative, even if the Statute had been in 
 
 31. See Naomi Koppel, UN Rights Chief Decries Terror Acts, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Sept. 25, 2001, available at 2001 WL 28012152. 
The terrorist attacks on the United States were a “‘crime against humanity” under 
international law, the United Nations human rights chief said Tuesday. 
  Mary Robinson said she felt there was no doubt that the attacks constituted “a 
widespread, deliberate targeting of a civilian population”—one of the definitions of a 
crime against humanity set down in U.N. treaties.  The attackers had “crossed a line” 
beyond terrorism, said Robinson, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
Id. 
 32. Press Release, supra note 23, § 1(e). 
 33. T.R. Reid, Europeans Reluctant to Send Terror Suspects to U.S.: Allies Oppose Death 
Penalty and Bush’s Plan for Secret Military Tribunals, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at A23, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com. 
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force on September 11 and even if the United States were a party.  It is 
debatable whether the September 11 atrocities are within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, and in any event the Court’s jurisdiction could be precluded by an 
investigation and prosecution of the defendants (assuming that they would be 
Osama bin Laden and others in the Al Queda network) by Saudi Arabia, 
Afghanistan or another state. 
The investigation or prosecution must be “genuine,” and not for “the 
purpose of” shielding the defendant, or with “unjustified delay,” or not 
“conducted independently or impartially, and . . . conducted in a manner . . . 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”34  These 
elaborate principles of complementarity, which would serve to protect U.S. 
personnel serving abroad, could also permit a trial in a foreign court, so that 
the ICC might never get the case.  Moreover, although the U.N. Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, opined that the attacks were crimes against 
humanity, the text of the Rome Statute presents some ambiguity.  To be 
covered the acts would have to be “part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”35  
Their status as “war crimes” is also contestable. 
The most immediate shift in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy 
since the September 11 attacks was its shift from a penchant for a unilateral 
foreign policy toward multilateral engagement in its multiple responses to the 
attacks.  Although that shift seems to have been temporary, achievement of the 
long-term goal of suppressing terrorism will require multilateral cooperation 
on a grand scale.  The most daunting challenge to American foreign policy is 
the creation of a series of coalitions—to wage the war, to track down terrorists 
assets, and to suppress future terrorist conspiracies that may threaten the 
United States.  It will be a challenge to Congress as well as to the Executive 
Branch, requiring, for example, more generous appropriations for foreign 
policy oriented programs and reconsideration of unproductive economic 
sanctions legislation. 
The most important, and most difficult, challenge in the long term for the 
country—Congress as well as the President—is to create an anti-terrorism 
coalition, in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East, that can suppress 
terrorist conspiracies at their roots.  This cannot be done by the United States 
and NATO from outside, but must be done internally through effective police, 
law-enforcement and education by governments, many of which we have been 
at odds with over a whole range of issues.  To induce neutral, indifferent and 
even traditionally hostile governments to effectively stop terrorists 
conspiracies, to deploy sufficient police effort to law-enforcement, to share 
 
 34. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 17 § 2(a)-(c). 
 35. Id. art. 7 § 1. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY 475 
intelligence information and to cooperate securely in trans-border 
investigations will require significant inducements.  This will be the hard part. 
First, we will need to reestablish or substantially upgrade diplomatic 
relations with states that have been anathema to us in the past (for instance, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon and Syria, just to name some in the Middle East).  
Second, we will need to offer inducements for genuine cooperation, not only 
from key states like Iran, but also from states that may not in fact turn out to be 
willing to match action on the ground with public rhetoric.  This will require 
money to support the foreign police and intelligence help we seek.  For these 
appropriations of foreign assistance Congress will have to be generous to a 
greater degree than in the past.  Third, we will need to change failed policies 
based on economic sanctions and isolation in favor of inducements to 
cooperation and interaction.  This, too, would require Congressional action as 
well as new Executive policy.  Fourth, the President and political, social and 
religious leaders throughout the country should mount serious public 
educational efforts to help the American people better understand the extent 
and basis of the anger against our country and the conditions abroad with 
which our foreign policy is designed to deal.  Finally, while we affirm our 
support for Israel, we need to move decisively to create the state of Palestine, 
acting if necessary through the U.N. Security Council in the manner employed 
to create the state of Israel. 
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